

# United States District Court

FOR THE  
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VENUE: SAN FRANCISCO

**FILED**

JUL 30 2014

RICHARD W. WIEKING  
CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT  
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

v.

**CR 14 175**

**TEH**

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC  
COMPANY

DEFENDANT(S).

## SUPERSEDING INDICTMENT

COUNT ONE: 18 U.S.C. § 1505 – Obstruction of an Agency Proceeding  
COUNTS TWO THROUGH TWENTY-EIGHT: 49 U.S.C. § 60123 -- Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act

A true bill.

*J. Debra*  
Foreman

Filed in open court this 29 day of July, 2014

*Rose Maher* ROSE MAHER

*Maria Elena James*  
United States Chief Magistrate Judge Clerk

NO PROCESS Bail, \$ \_\_\_\_\_

AO 257 (Rev. 6/78)

**DEFENDANT INFORMATION RELATIVE TO A CRIMINAL ACTION - IN U.S. DISTRICT COURT**

BY:  COMPLAINT  INFORMATION  INDICTMENT  
 SUPERSEDING

**OFFENSE CHARGED**

Count One: 18 U.S.C. § 1505 - Obstruction of the NTSB's Investigation  
Counts Two through Twenty-Eight: 49 U.S.C. § 60123 - Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act

Petty  
 Minor  
 Misdemeanor  
 Felony

**PENALTY:**

Maximum Penalties for Count 1: \$500,000.00 fine or twice the gross gain or loss; \$100 special assessment  
Maximum Penalties for Counts 2-28: \$500,000 fine or twice the gross gain or loss; \$100 special assessment

**PROCEEDING**

Name of Complainant Agency, or Person (& Title, if any)

Zurvohn Maloof, Special Agent, U.S. Department of Transportation

person is awaiting trial in another Federal or State Court, give name of court

this person/proceeding is transferred from another district per (circle one) FRCrP 20, 21 or 40. Show District

this is a reprosecution of charges previously dismissed which were dismissed on motion of:  
 U.S. Att'y  Defense } SHOW DOCKET NO.

this prosecution relates to a pending case involving this same defendant } MAGISTRATE CASE NO.  
 prior proceedings or appearance(s) before U.S. Magistrate regarding this defendant were recorded under

Name and Office of Person Furnishing Information on THIS FORM: MELINDA L. HAAG  
 U.S. Att'y  Other U.S. Agency

Name of Asst. U.S. Att'y (if assigned): KIM BERGER

Name of District Court, and/or Judge/Magistrate Location  
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

**FILED**

DEFENDANT - U.S.

PACIFIC GAS AND ENERGY CORPORATION  
DISTRICT COURT NUMBER CR 14-00175 TEH

**DEFENDANT**

**IS NOT IN CUSTODY**

- 1)  Has not been arrested, pending outcome this proceeding. If not detained give date any prior summons was served on above charges
- 2)  Is a Fugitive
- 3)  Is on Bail or Release from (show District)

Northern District of California

**IS IN CUSTODY**

- 4)  On this charge
  - 5)  On another conviction
  - 6)  Awaiting trial on other charges }  Fed'l  State
- If answer to (6) is "Yes", show name of Institution

Has detainer been filed?  Yes  No } If "Yes" give date filed

DATE OF ARREST: \_\_\_\_\_ Month/Day/Year

Or... if Arresting Agency & Warrant were not \_\_\_\_\_ Month/Day/Year

DATE TRANSFERRED TO U.S. CUSTODY: \_\_\_\_\_

This report amends AO 257 previously submitted

**ADDITIONAL INFORMATION OR COMMENTS**

**PROCESS:**

SUMMONS  NO PROCESS\*  WARRANT Bail Amount: \_\_\_\_\_

If Summons, complete following:  
 Arraignment  Initial Appearance  
Defendant Address: \_\_\_\_\_

\*Where defendant previously apprehended on complaint, no new summons or warrant needed, since Magistrate has scheduled arraignment

Date/Time: \_\_\_\_\_

Before Judge: \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

1 MELINDA HAAG (CABN 132612)  
2 United States Attorney

**FILED**  
JUL 30 2014  
RICHARD W. WIEKING  
CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT  
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
10 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA  
11 SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

**TEH**

**CR 14 175**

13 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

14 Plaintiff,

17 v.

19 PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY,

21 Defendant.

) NO.

) VIOLATIONS: Obstruction of an Agency  
) Proceeding (18 U.S.C. § 1505); Failure to Gather and  
) Integrate Relevant Data to Identify All Potential  
) Threats To a Gas Transmission Pipeline (49 U.S.C. §  
) 60123 and 49 C.F.R. § 192.917(b)); Failure to  
) Maintain Certain Repair Records for a Gas  
) Transmission Pipeline (49 U.S.C. § 60123 and 49  
) C.F.R. § 192.709(a)); Failure to Identify and Evaluate  
) Potential Threats to a Gas Transmission Pipeline (49  
) U.S.C. § 60123 and 49 C.F.R. § 192.917(a)); Failure  
) to Include All Potential Threats and to Select a  
) Suitable Threat Assessment Method for a Gas  
) Transmission Pipeline (49 U.S.C.  
) § 60123 and 49 C.F.R. § 192.919); Failure to  
) Prioritize a Gas Transmission Pipeline With an  
) Unstable Manufacturing Threat (49 U.S.C. § 60123  
) and 49 C.F.R. § 192.917(e)(3)); Failure to Prioritize  
) and Assess a Gas Transmission Pipeline With an  
) Unstable Manufacturing Threat (49 U.S.C.  
) § 60123 and 49 C.F.R. § 192.917(e)(4)); and Failure  
) to Make and Retain Stress Test Pressure Records (49  
) U.S.C. § 60123 and 49 C.F.R. § 192.517(a))

27  
28

1 SUPERSEDING INDICTMENT

2 The Grand Jury charges:

3 At all times relevant to this Indictment unless otherwise indicated:

4 INTRODUCTORY ALLEGATIONS

5 1. PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY ("PG&E") was a California corporation  
6 headquartered in San Francisco, California, that provided natural gas and electric services to  
7 approximately 15 million customers in Northern and Central California.

8 2. PG&E was a pipeline operator that provided natural gas to customers through the use of  
9 over 6,000 miles of natural gas transmission pipelines and over 40,000 miles of distribution pipelines.  
10 Gas transmission pipelines are highly-pressurized, large-diameter lines that carry natural gas to smaller,  
11 less pressurized distribution pipelines that bring natural gas into homes, commercial buildings, and other  
12 facilities.

13 3. Line 132 was a high-pressure gas transmission pipeline owned and operated by PG&E in  
14 the Northern District of California. Line 132 ran underground from Milpitas, California, to San  
15 Francisco, California, passing through the City of San Bruno, California.

16 4. Line 132 was originally installed in or about and between 1944 and 1948 and consisted of  
17 hundreds of individual segments, the majority of which were in suburban or urban areas.

18 5. On September 9, 2010, at approximately 6:11 p.m., a portion of Line 132 (Segment 180)  
19 ruptured in a residential neighborhood of the City of San Bruno (the "San Bruno explosion"). Gas  
20 escaping from the rupture ignited, causing a fire that killed eight people and injured 58 others. The fire  
21 also damaged 108 homes, 38 of which were completely destroyed.

22 The Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968

23 6. The Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968 ("PSA") established minimum safety  
24 standards for pipeline transportation and for pipeline facilities. The purpose of the PSA was to protect  
25 against risks to life or property posed by pipeline transportation and pipeline facilities by improving the  
26 regulatory and enforcement authority of the Secretary of Transportation.

1 7. In 1970, pursuant to Chapter 601 of the PSA, the Secretary of Transportation issued  
2 regulations codified in Section 192 of Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Subparts A through  
3 M (“Section 192”).

4 8. In 1979, Congress amended the PSA to add criminal penalties for knowing and willful  
5 violations of any regulation or order issued pursuant to Chapter 601 of the PSA. 49 U.S.C. § 60123.

6 The Gas Transmission Integrity Management Rule and Relevant Regulations

7 9. Congress amended the PSA by enacting the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002  
8 (“PSIA”). The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (“PHMSA”) issued the Gas  
9 Transmission Integrity Management regulations (“IM regulations”), 49 C.F.R. Part 192, referred to as  
10 Subpart O, to implement the requirements of the PSIA. The IM regulations specified how pipeline  
11 operators were required to identify, prioritize, assess, evaluate, remediate, and validate the integrity of  
12 segments of gas transmission pipelines that could, in the event of leak or failure, affect high-  
13 consequence areas (“HCAs”). 49 C.F.R. §§ 192.901-192.949. An HCA is a locale where a release of  
14 gas could pose a significant risk of injury or death.

15 10. The IM regulations required pipeline operators to identify threats on segments of their  
16 gas transmission pipelines that operated in HCAs (hereinafter “covered segments”), rank the risk levels  
17 of these identified threats, select an assessment method or technology with a proven application capable  
18 of assessing the known or potential threats, create deadlines for both the initial and future assessments of  
19 these covered segments, and address the threats identified and evaluated through mitigation,  
20 remediation, and prevention. 49 C.F.R. §§ 192.907 and 192.921.

21 Regulations Regarding the Identification of Potential Threats

22 11. Under the IM regulations, pipeline operators had to identify and evaluate all potential  
23 threats to a covered segment. 49 C.F.R. § 192.917(a). The nine major threats to gas transmission  
24 pipelines were: third party damage, external corrosion, internal corrosion, stress corrosion cracking,  
25 manufacturing threats, construction threats, equipment threats, external factors such as weather and  
26 earthquakes, and incorrect operation. 49 C.F.R. § 192.7 (incorporating by reference American Society  
27 of Mechanical Engineers (“ASME”) B31.8S, 2004).  
28

1           12. To identify and evaluate all potential threats to each covered segment, pipeline operators  
2 were required to gather and integrate existing data and information on the entire pipeline that could be  
3 relevant to the covered segment. 49 C.F.R. § 192.917(b). Section 192.917(b) required pipeline  
4 operators to follow a specific industry standard - ASME B31.8S, section 4 - and, at a minimum, gather  
5 and evaluate data for each covered segment and any similar, non-covered segments found in the entire  
6 pipeline system, including, but not limited to:

- 7           • Past incident history and the root cause analysis of previous threats on the segment,  
8           including leak and failure history.
- 9           • Records regarding past and ongoing corrosion of the segment.
- 10          • Continuous surveillance records regarding any changes along the segment including  
11          failures, leaks, and earth movement as well as changes along the segment that might  
12          affect its class location.
- 13          • Patrolling records regarding third party damage and encroachment threats to the segment.
- 14          • Maintenance history including repairs on the segment (pursuant to Section 192.709(a) of  
15          Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations, each pipeline operator was required to  
16          maintain the date, location, and description of each repair made to pipe so long as the  
17          pipeline remained in service).
- 18          • Records of internal inspections for issues such as internal corrosion, seam welding faults  
19          or repairs, and the existence of liquids being trapped or transported in the segment.
- 20          • The thickness of the walls of the segment.
- 21          • The diameter of the segment.
- 22          • The type of seams used along the segment and the corresponding “joint factor” that was  
23          used to calculate the initial pressure-carrying capacity of the pipe.
- 24          • The manufacturer and date of manufacture of the segment.
- 25          • The “depth of cover” or the amount of clearance between the top of the segment and the  
26          surface of the ground.
- 27          • Construction techniques, including bending or joining methods.
- 28          • Material properties, such as specified minimum yield strength (“SMYS”).
- The results of any pressure tests conducted on the pipeline containing the segment.

- Any pressure fluctuations or records of “cyclic fatigue” or the weakening of a pipeline due to pressure fluctuations on the pipeline containing the segment.
- Normal maximum and minimum operating pressures for the segment.
- Any audits or reviews that identified issues for the segment or made recommendations for mitigation or prevention of those issues.

Baseline Assessment Plan and Assessment Method Regulations

13. The IM regulations required pipeline operators to prepare, no later than December 17, 2004, a Baseline Assessment Plan (“BAP”) that identified all of the pipeline operator’s covered segments, the known or potential threats to each covered segment, the methods selected to assess the integrity of the pipeline for each covered segment, and deadlines for conducting an initial assessment and re-assessment. 49 C.F.R. § 192.919.

14. Once the known and potential threats were identified on a covered segment, the IM regulations required pipeline operators to assess the integrity of the pipeline in each covered segment by using an assessment method that was capable of addressing the specific identified threats. 49 C.F.R. § 192.921(a). The four assessment methods available to assess whether a covered segment was susceptible to the identified threats were:

(1) Subpart J pressure testing: a method of testing the strength of a pipeline by pressurizing a portion of the pipeline to a specified test pressure and monitoring that portion of the pipeline for leaks or ruptures. The test had to comply with the requirements of Subpart J of Section 192. When the test was performed with a liquid, this method was also known as a “hydrotest” or a “Subpart J hydrotest.” 49 C.F.R. § 192.921(a)(2).

i. Starting in 1970, all new gas transmission pipelines had to be pressure tested or hydrotested before being placed into service in order to ensure the pipeline’s integrity. Pursuant to Section 192.619 of Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations, gas transmission pipelines installed before 1970 that were found to be in “satisfactory condition” were grandfathered in and did not have to be pressure tested or hydrotested unless otherwise required by law.

ii. A pressure test or hydrotest was the only assessment method that could test the strength of a pipeline. Performing a pressure test or hydrotest on a gas transmission pipeline



1 necessitated the expense and inconvenience of taking the pipeline out of service temporarily.

2           iii.     Pressure testing or hydrotesting assessed the integrity of a pipeline for such  
3 potential threats as external damage, external corrosion, internal corrosion, stress corrosion  
4 cracking, and manufacturing and construction threats, such as seam defects and seam corrosion.

5           (2) In-line inspection (“ILI”): a method of examining the internal characteristics of a pipeline by  
6 sending a computerized inspection tool, often called a “pig,” through the inside of the pipeline. 49  
7 C.F.R. § 192.921(a)(1).

8           i.     Like pressure testing or hydrotesting, ILI assessed the integrity of the pipeline for  
9 such potential threats as external damage, external corrosion, internal corrosion, stress corrosion  
10 cracking, and manufacturing and construction threats. ILI, however, could not test the actual  
11 strength of a pipeline.

12           (3) Direct assessment (“DA”): a process used to detect the presence of corrosion and assess the  
13 potential threat to the integrity of the pipeline. 49 C.F.R. § 192.921(a)(3). The three methods of DA  
14 were:

15           i.     External corrosion direct assessment or “ECDA,” which tested the outside of  
16 pipelines for external corrosion and third party damage using an electrical or magnetic  
17 technology above ground and then following up with interspersed excavations to uncover the  
18 portions of the pipelines most likely to have external corrosion. Because ECDA only assessed  
19 the outside of pipelines, it could not assess the integrity of pipelines for potential internal threats  
20 such as manufacturing or construction defects;

21           ii.    Internal corrosion direct assessment (“ICDA”), which tested for corrosion inside  
22 the pipeline; and

23           iii.   Stress crack corrosion direct assessment (“SCCDA”), which was only applicable  
24 to pipelines operating over 60% of SMYS and thus not applicable in most HCAs.

25           (4) New Technology: any technology that a pipeline operator demonstrated could provide an  
26 understanding of a pipe’s condition that was equivalent to the understanding that could be gained using  
27 pressure tests or hydrotests, ILI, or DA. Operators could only use a new technology if PHMSA  
28 approved its use. 49 C.F.R. § 192.921(a)(4).



Regulations Related to the Prioritization of Manufacturing Threats

15. The IM regulations required operators to prioritize the risk level of covered segments in the BAP. 49 C.F.R. § 192.917(e)(3)(i)-(iii). Operators were required to prioritize covered segments with unstable manufacturing threats as “high risk.” Covered segments with manufacturing threats were considered unstable if the operating pressure of the pipeline containing that segment increased above the maximum operating pressure experienced by that segment in the five years before the segment was identified as being in an HCA (the “5-year MOP”), the maximum allowable operating pressure (“MAOP”) increased, or the stresses leading to cyclic fatigue increased. 49 C.F.R. § 192.917(e)(3)(i)-(iii).

16. Pipeline operators also had to prioritize as high risk and select an assessment method capable of assessing seam integrity and seam corrosion anomalies for covered pipeline segments that contained:

- a) low-frequency electric resistance welded (“ERW”) pipe;
- b) lap welded pipe; or
- c) other pipe that satisfies the conditions specified in ASME/ANSI B31.8S, Appxs. A4.3 & A4.4;

and had experienced either:

- d) a seam failure; or
- e) an increase in operating pressure over the 5-year MOP.

49 C.F.R. § 192.917(e)(4).

17. For pipelines with unstable manufacturing threats, operators had to use an assessment method that was capable of evaluating manufacturing threats, such as a hydrotest. 49 C.F.R. § 192.917(e)(3) and (4). ECDA could not be used because ECDA does not assess manufacturing threats. 49 C.F.R. § 192.923(a).

Regulations Related to Continuous Evaluation of Covered Pipeline Segments

18. Pipeline operators were required to periodically evaluate the integrity of each covered segment. The periodic evaluation included considering and integrating past and present integrity assessment results, integrating data and assessing risk of the entire pipeline, and reviewing decisions

1 regarding remediation, additional prevention, and mitigation actions. Operators were required to use the  
2 results from these periodic evaluations to identify the threats specific to each covered segment and the  
3 risk represented by these threats. 49 C.F.R. § 192.937.

4 19. After an initial assessment, pipeline operators had to re-assess their lines using an  
5 assessment method capable of assessing a particular threat or combination of threats including new  
6 threats, and within a certain time period depending on the results the periodic evaluations, but not to  
7 exceed seven years. 49 C.F.R. §§ 192.937 and 192.939.

#### 8 Regulations Related to Strength Test Pressure Records

9 20. Pipeline operators were required to pressure test the strength of certain pipelines newly  
10 installed or returned to service after 1970. 49 C.F.R. § 192.503. Specifically, pressure tests were  
11 required for a) segments of steel pipelines that operated at a hoop stress of 30 percent or more of the  
12 SMYS (49 C.F.R. § 192.505), and b) segments of steel pipelines that operated below 30 percent of  
13 SMYS, but at a pressure greater than 100 psi (49 C.F.R. § 192.507).

14 21. Pipeline operators were also required to keep records of the pressure tests conducted  
15 pursuant to Sections 192.505 and 192.507 for the useful life of the pipeline. 49 C.F.R. § 192.517(a).  
16 The test records were required to contain at least the following information:

- 17 • the test medium used;
- 18 • the test pressure;
- 19 • the test duration;
- 20 • pressure recording charts;
- 21 • elevation variations, if significant;
- 22 • leaks and failures noted and their disposition, and
- 23 • the name of the employee performing the test.

#### 24 PG&E's Practices Relating to Gas Transmission Pipelines

##### 25 A. General Recordkeeping

26 22. Starting at a time unknown to the grand jury, and continuing until the San Bruno  
27 explosion, PG&E learned that it did not have complete data for its gas transmission pipelines due to  
28

1 missing records and errors and omissions in existing records.

2 23. PG&E received notice of recordkeeping problems through employees, through regulatory  
3 agencies including the National Transportation Safety Board (“NTSB”) and the California Public  
4 Utilities Commission, and from third party auditors and consultants.

5 24. Despite knowledge of these deficiencies, PG&E did not create a recordkeeping system  
6 for gas operations that would ensure that pipeline records were accessible, traceable, verifiable, accurate,  
7 and complete. PG&E’s recordkeeping deficiencies included:

- 8 • PG&E did not maintain accurate and complete leak records for its gas transmission  
9 pipelines.
- 10 • PG&E did not maintain accurate and complete records regarding encroachment of  
11 population along gas transmission pipelines.
- 12 • PG&E did not maintain repair records for its gas transmission pipelines in a traceable and  
13 accessible manner.
- 14 • PG&E did not retain or maintain weld maps and weld inspection records for its gas  
15 transmission pipelines.
- 16 • PG&E did not maintain complete records of the manufacturer of its gas transmission  
17 pipelines in service.
- 18 • PG&E did not retain or maintain Subpart J pressure test records for the life of all of its  
19 gas transmission pipelines.
- 20 • PG&E did not maintain accurate, complete, or accessible “job files,” that contained,  
21 among other things, pipe specifications, construction records, pressure test records, and  
22 purchasing records.

21 B. Integrity Management Program

22 25. In the late 1990s, in advance of the enactment of the IM regulations, PG&E created a  
23 computer database, called the Geographic Information System (the “GIS database”). PG&E intended  
24 that the GIS database would contain information about each natural gas transmission pipeline segment,  
25 such as pipe specifications and pressure test data, and would be used to make integrity management  
26 decisions.

27 26. To create the GIS database, PG&E relied on pipeline survey sheets that contained  
28 erroneous and incomplete information. In creating the GIS database, PG&E undertook no quality

1 control or quality assurance to ensure the data taken from the pipeline survey sheets was accurate. From  
2 GIS's inception, PG&E was aware that the database contained erroneous and incomplete information.

3 27. PG&E relied on information in the GIS database to make integrity management  
4 decisions, including the identification of threats to each covered segment contained in the initial BAP.

5 C. Threat Identification

6 28. In identifying and evaluating threats as required by Sections 192.917(a) and (b), PG&E  
7 failed to gather and integrate all relevant data for many of its older transmission lines, including, but not  
8 limited to:

- 9 • past incident history for both covered and non-covered segments, including leaks with  
10 unknown causes ("unknown" because PG&E either had no records, or could not or did not  
11 locate such records);
- 12 • pipeline history for covered and non-covered segments that were greater than one mile  
13 away from the covered segments being analyzed for manufacturing and construction  
14 threats;
- 15 • maintenance history, including repairs;
- 16 • accurate and complete pipeline data, including wall thickness, diameter, seam type,  
17 manufacturer, and date of manufacture;
- 18 • pressure fluctuations;
- 19 • validated normal, maximum, and minimum operating pressures;
- 20 • threats created by cyclic fatigue; and
- 21 • threats created by internal corrosion.

22 D. Assessment Method Selection

23 29. PG&E relied on inaccurate and incomplete records to select assessment methods to assess  
24 the integrity of covered segments for known or potential threats as required by Section 192.921(a).

25 30. In 2004, PG&E created a written policy on compliance with the IM regulations regarding  
26 data gathering that instructed PG&E employees to rely on available, verifiable information or  
27 "information that c[ould] be obtained in a timely manner."

28 31. In 2004, PG&E also created a written policy that proscribed, with certain limited  
exceptions, the use of hydrotesting or pressure testing as an assessment method for assessing the  
integrity of covered segments. Pursuant to this policy, the only two options (other than a PHMSA-

1 approved new technology) for assessing threats on covered segments were ILI and ECDA. PG&E  
2 instituted this policy having determined that, due to economic considerations and the physical attributes  
3 of its transmission lines, ILI was not a feasible assessment method for approximately 80% of its  
4 transmission lines that were subject to the IM regulations.

5 32. For the approximately 80% of the gas transmission pipelines where PG&E determined  
6 that ILI was not economically or physically feasible, PG&E selected ECDA to assess threats on those  
7 pipelines. PG&E chose ILI as an assessment method for the approximately 20% of its remaining natural  
8 gas transmission pipelines.

9 E. Assessment Avoidance on Older Transmission Lines

10 i. Planned Pressure Increases

11 33. When the IM regulations went into effect, PG&E knew that thousands of miles of its gas  
12 transmission pipelines had never been subjected to a Subpart J pressure test, because the pipelines were  
13 installed before 1970 and were grandfathered in or because PG&E had not maintained a record of such a  
14 pressure test. As PG&E knew, many of these pipelines had a known or potential manufacturing threat  
15 due to their age, manufacturer, and/or history.

16 34. In order to maintain the then-current operating pressures of these pipelines without  
17 having to subject the pipelines to a Subpart J pressure test, PG&E adopted a practice in 2003 called  
18 "planned pressure increases" ("PPIs"). To conduct a PPI, PG&E intentionally raised the pressure in  
19 several old highly-pressurized gas transmission pipelines located in HCAs to the pipelines' maximum  
20 allowable operating pressures (MAOP) for two hours. In so doing, PG&E at times exceeded the lines'  
21 5-year MOPs and/or MAOPs. PG&E failed to review the history of the pipelines or verify the accuracy  
22 of its data prior to executing the PPIs to determine whether intentionally increasing the pressure on these  
23 older pipelines would affect the integrity of the pipeline. PG&E periodically conducted PPIs from 2003  
24 until the San Bruno explosion.

25 35. PG&E executed PPIs on a number of its high pressure gas transmission pipelines,  
26 including lines 132, 101, 107, and 109, all of which had covered segments with manufacturing threats  
27 that had never been subject to a Subpart J pressure test or for which records of such a test were not  
28 available. From 2002 until the San Bruno explosion, PG&E assessed these pipelines with ECDA.

ii. Unplanned Pressure Increases

36. PG&E was aware that hundreds of covered segments totaling over 80 miles of gas transmission pipelines had never been subject to a Subpart J pressure test and had manufacturing threats that could be considered unstable due to planned and/or unplanned pressure increases that exceeded the pipelines' respective 5-year MOPs. These covered segments were found on numerous gas transmission pipelines operated by PG&E, including, but not limited to, segments on Lines 132, 153, 109, 191-1 and DFM 1816-01.

37. Section 192.917(e) required PG&E to prioritize the covered segments with unstable manufacturing threats as high risk and assess them using an assessment method that evaluated the integrity of the covered segment to determine the risk of failure from the unstable manufacturing threats, such as a Subpart J pressure test. For all of these covered segments, despite knowledge of the requirements of Section 192.917(e), PG&E chose not to reprioritize these pipelines as high risk and/or properly assess the integrity of each segment to determine the risk of failure. Instead, PG&E continued to choose ECDA to assess the integrity of these pipelines even though PG&E knew ECDA did not assess unstable manufacturing threats.

38. To avoid having to prioritize these pipelines as "high risk" and properly assess the pipelines for the known threats, PG&E chose only to consider a manufacturing threat unstable if the pressure on the pipeline exceeded the 5-year MOP by 10% or more. This practice was documented in PG&E's Integrity Management program as Risk Management Instruction-06, and was known to members of Integrity Management as RMI-06. PG&E adopted and implemented this approach despite knowing that it was in direct contravention of Section 192.917(e) and guidance issued by PHMSA in or about 2004 and 2005 in the form of frequently asked questions and answers ("FAQs"). In FAQ 221, PHMSA made clear that "any pressure increase, regardless of amount," destabilized a manufacturing threat and required PG&E to prioritize the pipeline as high risk and to properly assess the pipeline. PG&E maintained this practice until April 2011.

F. Line 132

39. When identifying threats on Line 132, and when determining the appropriate assessment technology to use in evaluating those threats, PG&E did not know the thickness of the pipeline walls for

1 approximately 42% of Line 132, either because PG&E did not have records describing wall thickness or  
2 it could not or did not access records with this information.

3 40. PG&E did not know the manufacturer for approximately 80% of the hundreds of  
4 segments on Line 132 either because PG&E did not have such records, or could not or did not access  
5 such records with this information.

6 41. PG&E did not know the depth of cover for approximately 80% of Line 132 because  
7 PG&E did not have such records, or could not or did not access such records with this information.

8 42. PG&E used improper yield strength or SMYS values for several segments of pipe on  
9 Line 132 with unknown yield strengths.

10 i. Segment 180

11 43. Segment 180, the portion of Line 132 that ruptured, was located in an HCA and ran  
12 through a densely populated suburban development in the City of San Bruno. Segment 180 consisted of  
13 six short lengths or “pups” of 30-inch diameter pipe along with normal lengths of pipe. The date of  
14 manufacture of these pups is unknown, but the manufacture date was prior to 1956. The pups were  
15 welded together and installed in approximately 1956 in a manner that violated industry standards  
16 concerning fabrication of gas transmission pipelines in effect at the time. One or more of the pups had a  
17 defective seam weld. The segment, in part due to the defective pup or pups, had a yield strength  
18 significantly less than the yield strength that PG&E recorded and relied upon for integrity management  
19 purposes.

20 44. PG&E’s records reflected the following for Segment 180:

- 21 • The pipe was seamless.
  - 22 • The SMYS was 42,000 psi.
  - 23 • The depth of cover was unknown.
  - 24 • The manufacturer of the pipe was unknown.
  - 25 • The manufacture date of the pipe was 1956.
  - 26 • A pressure test had been performed in 1961.
  - 27 • The MAOP was 400 psi.
- 28



1 45. In fact, the pipe in Segment 180 was seamed, not seamless. The SMYS was unknown,  
2 but measured after the San Bruno explosion at significantly less than 42,000 psi for four of the six pups.  
3 The pipe manufacturer date was unknown, but occurred well before 1956. No records of a pressure test  
4 existed showing that any pressure test, let alone a Subpart J pressure test, had been performed on  
5 Segment 180. Other records in PG&E's files also showed the MAOP for Line 132 as 375 and 390 psi.

6 46. At no time between installation of the defective pup or pups and the San Bruno explosion  
7 did PG&E check or confirm whether its records accurately reflected the data relevant to assessing the  
8 integrity of Segment 180, even though PG&E knew that GIS contained incomplete and inaccurate data.

9 ii. Integrity Management For Line 132

10 47. PG&E identified segments of Line 132 as being in an HCA in 2002 and began  
11 conducting ECDA on Line 132 in 2002. PG&E also conducted ECDA on Line 132 in 2003, 2004, 2006,  
12 2007, 2009, and 2010.

13 48. In identifying the threats that existed on Line 132 and choosing an assessment method to  
14 assess those identified threats, PG&E knowingly relied on erroneous and incomplete information from  
15 the GIS database and failed to gather and integrate, among other things, the following data and  
16 information:

- 17 • Leak data, including the cause of over 30 prior leaks on segments of Line 132; instead  
18 PG&E adopted a practice that it would not consider leaks with "unknown" causes when  
19 deciding if ECDA was a proper assessment method;
- 20 • Industry and PG&E data that showed that double submerged arc weld "DSAW"  
21 pipe manufactured by Western Consolidated Steel, which was found on segments  
22 of Line 132, including Segment 181, had pipe body and longitudinal seam defect  
23 issues;
- 24 • A seam weld defect in DSAW pipe that was discovered on a different segment of Line  
25 132, and was similar to pipe on both Segment 180 and Segment 181, and was repaired in  
26 1988;
- 27 • Multiple longitudinal seam cracks found during radiography of girth welds on portions of  
28 Line 132 that were constructed in 1948;
- A longitudinal seam weld defect in DSAW pipe discovered on a different segment of  
Line 132 in 1992 when a tie-in girth weld was radiographed;
- A defective weld found on Segment 186 of Line 132 in 2009. The segment was  
originally fabricated by Consolidated Western using pipe similar to Segment 180 and

1 Segment 181 and installed in 1948, at or near the time when Segment 180 was originally  
2 installed;

- 3 • A field girth weld defect found on Segment 189 in 2009. Segment 189 was also  
4 originally fabricated by Consolidated Western using DSAW pipe installed in 1948;
- 5 • Whether any salvaged or re-used pipe, for which PG&E did not keep records,  
6 including manufacturer, dates of use, and history of the pipe, had been used on  
7 Line 132;
- 8 • Documents related to the design, manufacturer, construction, or testing of  
9 Segment 180 when it was relocated in 1956, including whether any salvaged pipe  
10 was used;
- 11 • Information from the 1956 construction file related to the six pups installed on  
12 Segment 180 by PG&E;
- 13 • The potential impact of cyclic fatigue or other loading conditions on Line 132  
14 from planned or unplanned pressure fluctuations; and
- 15 • Additional construction defects on Line 132.

16 Integrity Management for Other Transmission Lines

17 49. PG&E also knowingly failed to gather and integrate the following relevant data from  
18 similar gas transmission pipeline segments as required by 49 C.F.R. § 192.917(b):

- 19 • A seam leak in DSAW pipe found on Line 300B in 1958;
- 20 • A root cause analysis for an explosion on Line 109 in 1963;
- 21 • A 1977 report concerning a leak on the long seam of Line 109;
- 22 • A characterization evaluation of nearby Line 109 girth welds in 1994;
- 23 • A Subpart J pressure test failure in 1974 of a seam weld with lack of penetration  
24 on DSAW pipe found on Line 300B, and which was similar to DSAW pipe found  
25 on Segment 180 and Segment 181;
- 26 • Laboratory test reports from 1975 relating to Line 101 girth welds; and,
- 27 • Cracking of a seam weld in DSAW pipe in 1996 on Line 109 which paralleled  
28 Line 132.

50. Relying on inaccurate and incomplete information regarding the pipeline attributes and  
history of Lines 132 and 109, PG&E knowingly chose ECDA as the assessment method to assess the  
integrity of covered segments on Line 132, including Segment 180, starting in 2002 and for Line 109  
starting in 2003, and continuing until the San Bruno explosion.

1           51.     In 2003 and again in 2008, as part of PG&E's PPIs, PG&E intentionally raised for a two-  
2 hour period the pressure of Line 132 at least 25 psi above the normal operating pressure the pipeline had  
3 experienced for decades in order to maintain a current MOP for Line 132 without having to conduct a  
4 Subpart J pressure test. PG&E undertook this practice without conducting any review of the pipeline's  
5 history, including past leaks and the cause of such leaks, or verification of the pipeline's specifications  
6 in order to assess whether intentionally increasing the pressure on Line 132 more than 25 pounds higher  
7 than the line had experienced in decades would affect the integrity of the pipeline.

8           52.     On July 23, 2009, Line 132, at a point north of Segment 180, experienced an unplanned  
9 pressure increase that exceeded that segment's 5-year MOP. That segment of Line 132 had a known  
10 manufacturing threat that was destabilized when the pipeline experienced this pressure increase.  
11 Despite knowledge of this pressure excursion and the requirement to properly assess unstable  
12 manufacturing threats, PG&E chose to assess that segment of Line 132 in 2009 using ECDA even  
13 though PG&E knew that ECDA could not assess unstable manufacturing threats.

#### 14                           Obstruction of the NTSB's Investigation

15           53.     The NTSB is an independent federal agency dedicated to promoting aviation, railroad,  
16 highway, marine, pipeline, and hazardous materials safety. Established in 1967, the agency is mandated  
17 by Congress through the Independent Safety Board of 1974 to investigate transportation accidents,  
18 determine the probable cause of accidents, issue safety recommendations, study transportation issues,  
19 and evaluate the safety of government agencies involved in transportation. The NTSB makes public its  
20 actions and decisions through accident reports, safety studies, special investigation reports, safety  
21 recommendations, and statistical reviews.

22           54.     The NTSB began an investigation immediately after the San Bruno explosion on  
23 September 9, 2010. NTSB investigators were on-site for approximately two weeks after the explosion.  
24 In addition, NTSB investigators issued numerous requests for information and documents, interviewed  
25 witnesses, examined the ruptured pipe and the events leading to the explosion, and held three days of  
26 public hearings. The NTSB issued a public report on or about August 30, 2011, and concluded, among  
27 other things, that PG&E's Integrity Management program was both deficient and ineffective, and was a  
28 probable cause of the accident.

1           55.     The NTSB's investigation revealed that among other deficiencies, PG&E's records  
2 related to the establishment and calculation of the MOP and MAOP for Line 132 were incomplete and  
3 inaccurate. As a result, on January 3, 2011, the NTSB issued three safety recommendations, two of  
4 which were designated "urgent." The first urgent recommendation directed PG&E to "[a]ggressively  
5 and diligently search" for records related to pipelines in HCAs that did not have the MAOP established  
6 through prior hydrostatic testing. The second directed PG&E to calculate (based on the records found in  
7 response to the first urgent recommendation) the valid MAOP for pipelines that did not have the MAOP  
8 established through hydrostatic testing.

9           56.     Additionally, in or about September 2010, through in or about December 2010, the  
10 NTSB sent PG&E a series of data requests concerning instances where PG&E's planned and unplanned  
11 pressure increases exceeded the 5-year MOPs and/or MAOPs of pipelines in HCAs.

12           57.     On February 22, 2011, as part of its response to the NTSB's data requests, PG&E  
13 attached a version of RMI-06 that provided that PG&E would only consider a manufacturing threat as  
14 unstable if the pressure on the line exceeded the 5-year MOP by 10% ("the 10% Version"). The cover  
15 sheet to the 10% Version indicated that it was prepared in February 2008, and approved in March 2008.

16           58.     As set forth in paragraph 38 above, beginning in or about 2009, PG&E adopted the  
17 practice documented in the 10% Version, which was in direct contravention of Section 192.917(e) and  
18 guidance issued by PHMSA. The consequence of this practice was that PG&E did not prioritize as  
19 high-risk, and properly assess, many of its oldest transmission lines in HCAs, including Line 132, that  
20 had never been hydro tested because of the grandfather clause.

21           59.     On April 6, 2011, PG&E sent a letter to the NTSB withdrawing the 10% Version sent in  
22 February 2011, claiming it was an unapproved draft. The letter attached the original version of RMI-06  
23 approved in 2008, and a version of RMI-06 approved on April 5, 2011, neither of which included the  
24 10% language. In the letter, PG&E claimed it had recently discovered that the 10% Version submitted  
25 to the NTSB included the cover sheet for the original version of RMI-06 approved in 2008, and that  
26 PG&E had no indication that the version with the 10% language was ever approved.

27           60.     PG&E did not disclose that, from in or about 2009 through in or about April 2011, its  
28 Integrity Management group followed the practice set forth in the 10% Version by only considering

1 manufacturing threats active and high-risk if the pressure exceeded the MOP by 10%. The letter also  
 2 failed to disclose that PG&E knew the 10% Version was in violation of Section 192.917(e) and the  
 3 guidance issued by PHMSA with respect to Section 192.917(e).

4 THE CHARGES

5 COUNT ONE: (18 U.S.C. § 1505 – Obstruction of the NTSB’s Investigation)

6 61. The allegations set forth in paragraphs 1-8, 11-12, 15-19, 22-38, and 50-60 are re-alleged  
 7 and incorporated herein by reference.

8 On or about September 10, 2010, and continuing through on or about September 30, 2011, in the  
 9 Northern District of California, the defendant,

10 PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY,

11 did corruptly influence, obstruct, and impede, and did endeavor to influence, obstruct, and impede the  
 12 due and proper administration of the law under which a pending proceeding was being had before a  
 13 department and agency of the United States, specifically, an investigation by the National Transportation  
 14 Security Board into the cause of the San Bruno explosion and PG&E’s Integrity Management program.

15 All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1505.

16 COUNTS TWO AND THREE: (49 U.S.C. § 60123 – Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act)

17 62. The allegations set forth in paragraphs 1-14, 18-19, 22-28, and 39-52 above are  
 18 re-alleged and incorporated herein by reference.

19 63. Starting in or about December 2003, and continuing through on or about  
 20 September 9, 2010, in the Northern District of California, the defendant,

21 PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY,

22 by and through the actions of its employees, knowingly and willfully violated a minimum safety  
 23 standard for pipelines carrying natural gas, as set forth in Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations,  
 24 Section 192.917(b). Specifically, PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY knowingly and  
 25 willfully failed to gather and integrate existing data and information that could be relevant to  
 26 identifying and evaluating all potential threats on covered segments of the following lines:

Count	Date	Line
2	January 22, 2010	Line 132

3	January 22, 2010	Line 109
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All in violation of Title 49, United States Code, Section 60123.

COUNTS FOUR AND FIVE: (49 U.S.C. § 60123 -- Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act)

64. The allegations set forth in paragraphs 1-14, 18-19, 22-28, and 46-49 above are re-alleged and incorporated herein by reference.

65. Starting on a date unknown to the grand jury and continuing until at least on or about September 9, 2010, in the Northern District of California, the defendant,

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY,

by and through the actions of its employees, knowingly and willfully violated a minimum safety standard for pipelines carrying natural gas, as set forth in Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations, Section 192.709(a). Specifically, PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY knowingly and willfully failed to maintain records concerning the date, location, and description of each repair made to the following lines:

Count	Date	Line
4	January 22, 2010	Line 132
5	January 22, 2010	Line 109

All in violation of Title 49, United States Code, Section 60123.

COUNTS SIX THROUGH EIGHT: (49 U.S.C. § 60123 – Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act)

66. The allegations set forth in paragraphs 1-14, 18-19, 22-28, and 39-52 are re-alleged and incorporated herein by reference.

67. Starting on a date unknown to the grand jury and continuing through on or about the dates set forth in the table below, in the Northern District of California, the defendant,

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY,

by and through the actions of its employees, knowingly and willfully violated a minimum safety standard for pipelines carrying natural gas, as set forth in Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations, Section 192.917(a). Specifically, PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY knowingly and



1 willfully failed to identify and evaluate potential threats to covered segments on the lines set  
2 forth below:

Count	Date	Line
6	January 22, 2010	Line 132
7	January 22, 2010	Line 153
8	January 22, 2010	DFM 1816-01

7 All in violation of Title 49, United States Code, Section 60123.

8 COUNTS NINE THROUGH FOURTEEN: (49 U.S.C. § 60123 -- Natural Gas Pipeline Safety  
9 Act)

10 68. The allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 52 above are re-alleged and  
11 incorporated herein by reference.

12 69. Starting on a date unknown to the grand jury and continuing through on or about  
13 the dates set forth in the table below, in the Northern District of California, the defendant,  
14 **PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY,**  
15 by and through the actions of its employees, knowingly and willfully violated a minimum safety  
16 standard for pipelines carrying natural gas, as set forth in Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations,  
17 Section 192.919. Specifically, PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY knowingly and  
18 willfully failed to include in its annual baseline assessment plan all potential threats on a covered  
19 segment and failed to select the most suitable assessment method to assess all potential threats on  
20 covered segments on the lines set forth below:

Count	Date	Line
9	January 22, 2010	Line 132
10	January 22, 2010	Line 153
11	January 22, 2010	DFM 1816-01
12	January 22, 2010	Line 107
13	January 22, 2010	Line 191-1
14	January 22, 2010	Line 109



All in violation of Title 49, United States Code, Section 60123.

**COUNTS FIFTEEN THROUGH EIGHTEEN:** (49 U.S.C. § 60123 -- Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act)

70. The allegations set forth in paragraphs 1-10, 13-19, 29-38, and 51-52 above are re-alleged and incorporated herein by reference.

71. Starting on a date unknown to the grand jury and continuing through on or about the dates set forth in the table below, in the Northern District of California, the defendant,

**PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY,**

by and through the actions of its employees, knowingly and willfully violated a minimum safety standard for pipelines carrying natural gas, as set forth in Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations, Section 192.917(e)(3). Specifically, PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY knowingly and willfully failed to prioritize covered segments of lines as high risk segments for the baseline assessment or a subsequent reassessment, after a changed circumstance rendered manufacturing threats on segments of the lines set forth below unstable:

Count	Date	Line
15	January 22, 2010	Line 132
16	January 22, 2010	Line 153
17	January 22, 2010	DFM 1816-01
18	January 22, 2010	Line 109

All in violation of Title 49, United States Code, Section 60123.

**COUNTS NINETEEN THROUGH TWENTY-THREE:** (49 U.S.C. § 60123 -- Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act)

72. The allegations set forth in paragraphs 1-10, 13-19, 29-38, and 51-52 above are re-alleged and incorporated herein by reference.

73. Starting on a date unknown to the grand jury, and continuing through January 22, 2010, in the Northern District of California, the defendant,

**PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY,**

by and through the actions of its employees, knowingly and willfully violated a minimum safety

1 standard for pipelines carrying natural gas, as set forth in Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations,  
 2 Section 192.917(e)(4). Specifically, PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY knowingly  
 3 and willfully failed to prioritize covered segments of a line, as high risk segments for a baseline  
 4 assessment or a subsequent reassessment after a changed circumstance rendered manufacturing  
 5 threats on those segments unstable, and failed to analyze covered segments to determine the risk  
 6 of failure from such manufacturing threats on segments of the lines set forth below:

Count	Date	Line
19	January 22, 2010	DFM 1816-01
20	January 22, 2010	Line 191-1
21	January 22, 2010	Line 109
22	January 22, 2010	Line 107
23	January 22, 2010	Line 132

13  
 14 All in violation of Title 49, United States Code, Section 60123.

15 COUNTS TWENTY-FOUR THROUGH TWENTY-EIGHT: (49 U.S.C. § 60123 -- Natural  
 16 Gas Pipeline Safety Act)

17 74. The allegations set forth in paragraphs 1-10, 20-27, and 44-46 above are re-alleged and  
 18 incorporated herein by reference.

19 75. Starting in or about August 1970, and continuing through the date of this indictment, in  
 20 the Northern District of California, the defendant,

21 **PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY,**

22 by and through the actions of its employees, knowingly and willfully violated a minimum safety  
 23 standard for pipelines carrying natural gas, as set forth in Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations,  
 24 Section 192.517(a). Specifically, PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY knowingly and  
 25 willfully failed to retain for the useful life of the following pipelines, a strength test pressure  
 26 record that included the test medium, the test pressure and duration, pressure recording charts,  
 27 significant elevation variations, any leaks and failures noted, and the employee who performed  
 28 the test, for each test performed pursuant to Sections 192.505 and 192.507:

Count	Line
24	Line 132
25	Line 109
26	Line 153
27	Line 191-1
28	DFM 1816-01

All in violation of Title 49, United States Code, Section 60123.


SENTENCING ALLEGATIONS

76. With respect to the charges in this Superseding Indictment, for the purposes of determining the maximum alternative fine, pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 3571(d), the defendant,


PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY,


derived gross gains of approximately \$281 million, and the victims suffered losses of approximately \$565 million.

DATED: July 29, 2014

  
Foreperson

MELINDA HAAG  
United States Attorney

  
J. DOUGLAS WILSON  
Chief, Criminal Division

(Approved as to form: )  
AUSA BERGER  
AUSA HOFFMAN  
SAUSA HALBERSTADT  
SAUSA MORRIS